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Book Review
DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE
SCHOOLS By Lino A. Graglia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.
pp. 351. $11.50.
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*
There is little doubt that school desegregation is the most difficult and
most divisive issue facing the Supreme Court in this century. Nor could the
Court have avoided the issue-as it might in good conscience, for example,
have avoided such divisive questions as legislative reapportiomnent, and as it
did avoid passing on the constitutionality of the Vietnam war. 2 The condi-
tions of the 1950's made inevitable a decision on the constitutionality of legal-
ly separated public schools for blacks and whites. Once the issue was squarely
presented to the Court, the equal protection clause mandated the result
which the Court reached in Brown v. Board of Education.3 One may quarrel
over the role of social science research-whether, for example, footnote 114
should have been included at all-but such disputes do not affect the out-
come of the cases or the principles of decision. One may also question, as
many now do, the wisdom of deferring the implementation of a right once
recognized" -although "deliberate speed" would almost certainly in fact have
been the pace even if the Justices had ordered immediate desegregation
throughout the land.
It is at this point that consensus breaks down. Critics of the Supreme
Court's performance in the desegregation area have argued with increasing
fervor that the implications of Brown should have been limited earlier and
more narrowly. Among the most recent and sharpest of the critics is Prof.
Lino Graglia, a constitutional scholar of ability and distinction, who traces
the cycle back to its origins and follows the implications through 1975. The
title, Disaster by Decree, might suggest that a single judgment bears the
major onus for the current and (Graglia believes) unhappy condition of
public education. But the central thesis is not so much that the Supreme
*A.B., 1956; A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Vice President-Bloomington
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Court strayed at a particular point along the path, as that the Court
cumulated in the 1960's and compounded in the '70's errors initially made in
the '50's.
Professor Graglia conscientiously goes back to the beginning, and argues
that the Court in Brown did both more and less than it might have done. On
one hand, the understanding of Brown I would have been aided, and some of
the consequent confusion avoided, if the Court had been less conscientious in
its attempt to avoid squarely overruling the prior separate-but-equal cases.
On the other hand, the Court's objective could have been better achieved had
the Court in Brown H decreed immediate compliance. Moreover, a simpler
resolution of the remedy issue would have removed the need to call for a
"desegregation plan"-a mandate Graglia believes sowed some of the seeds of
the "disaster" which followed.
The chronicle proceeds in orderly fashion through the 1960's, which were
surprisingly free of major Supreme Court desegregation cases. (What did
characterize these years, but about which Graglia says relatively little, was the
painful effort of the lower federal and state courts outside the South to decide
how far Brown applied to racial imbalance resulting from residential patterns
rather than formal color bars.) Not until 1968 did the issue really return to
the Court, and then in a rather limited form.6 Yet the decisions in these years
did, in Professor Graglia's view, subtly if critically shift the focus from
eliminating desegregation to mandating integration; while the context was
still one of formal legal segregation, the reasoning arguably went beyond the
facts, and thus invited dangerous extrapolation by the lower courts.
If there was a watershed, it was the 1971 cases from Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
North Carolina.7 Noting that it was Chief Justice Burger who administered
the coup de grace, Graglia argues that in the Charlotte cases a formula for
integration was announced which went well beyond the racial conditions of
the South, and that new remedies (especially busing) were approved without
the limits necessary to keep lower courts from using them liberally. Although
the Court purported to reject precise mathematical formulas in favor of
gentler structures, Graglia claims the essential damage had now been done.
The Chief Justice's avowed misgivings soon after announcing the Charlotte
decisions" only served to confirm the gravity of the error and the portent of
the departure.
It might be well to pause at this point to appraise the quality of the
analysis. It is careful, thorough, and extensive. But it may at critical points
be tainted by an eagerness to fit untiday fragments into a mold. Take, for ex-
ample, the author's claim that in a companion to the main Charlotte case,
decided the same day, the Court ruled that "[b]using is 'absolutely essential to
6E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
'Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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fulfillment of [the] constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school
systems.' " The quotation is technically correct. And the case did deal with a
state law which, inter alia, forbade busing. But the context of the statement
was a bit different. The North Carolina law actually forbade any assignment
of students on the basis of race, thus foreclosing the very remedies which the
Court had just held might be warranted in such a case. The Chief Justice,
observed that as race must be considered in deciding whether constitutional
rights had been violated, "so also must race be considered in formulating a
remedy."' 0 Then follows the sentence containing the quoted phrase: "To for-
bid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive
school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their
constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems."" It is
risky to draw from this language the inference which Professor Graglia ties to
busing alone, even though busing was the central issue of the case.
Perhaps a comment about the book's style may be in order here, since it
reinforces the observation above. Strong criticism should employ vigorous and
forceful language, no less about Supreme Court decisions than about the acts
or omissions of lesser mortals. Certain of the opinions, however, come in for
extremely harsh attack. The majority in the Green case, for example, found
unlawful segregation by "a rarely equaled feat of sophistry." 2 In the Denver
case, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court "strains logic and credulity to
an extent rarely equaled even in 'desegregation' cases."' s The two dissenters
in the Detroit case fared even less well; Justice White "apparently failed to
read what the Court had said";' 4 Justice Marshall was "obtusely unable to
grasp the basis of the Court's decision";' 5 and the two dissenters were "less
than scrupulous in their use of facts or logic."' 6 These are strong words in-
deed, and have a somewhat jarring effect on the scholarly reader who
welcomes disappassionate conclusions consistent with the painstaking analysis
of the cases.
In at least one other respect the book is disappointing. In the final
chapter, after a careful and thoughtful analysis of essentially legal issues in
each of the major cases, the author turns his attention to the practical conse-
quences of the decisions. There is a troubling threshhold question- not fully
articulated or answered in the book-how far a court deciding constitutional
issues should or even can weigh practical consequences. (Graglia does not
challenge, for example, the Court's insistence in Cooper v. Aaron 7 that prac-
'Id. at 137.
"North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
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tical barriers to implementation of a desegregation decree could not impair
constitutional rights of black citizens). Even if some attention to the impact of
constitutional judgments on people and institutions is appropriate, it is ques-
tionable whether the Supreme Court should be faulted for disorder in urban
public schools, or for the added costs of busing, or for a decline in academic
standards, in some school districts. As a matter of public policy, such con-
cerns may well argue for legislation limiting (to the extent the constitution
allows) of judicial intervention in this area. But such effects, even if they
amount to a "disaster," do not blunt the force of the constitutional claims
which the Supreme Court has addressed since Brown v. Board of Education.
Even less can the Justices fairly be faulted for the flight of many white
families to the suburbs, or for parental resort to private segregated academies
-although since the completion of the book the Court has in fact closed to a
degree the latter avenue of evasion. '8 It is not inappropriate, of course, for a
comprehensive study of school desegregation to consider the practical effect of
the decisions which comprise its principal focus, and this may well be all that
is intended. But calling the Court's decision "ineffective and self-defeating
and, therefore, mistaken according to any standard"1 9 suggests that practical
detriments should defeat constitutional imperatives. That implication would
be most dangerous, and as Cooper v. Aaron makes clear, is not sound con-
stitutional law.
Such reservations about the book take nothing away from its significant
value. It is a careful study by a deeply concerned constitutional scholar who
believes that a fundamental question has been misperceived and incompletely
analyzed by the courts. There is much new and valuable material in the
book; it bears careful reading-more by those who favor the desegregation
decisions than by these who share the author's contrary view. Much has been
written on the positive side of the case, and the opposing position deserves the
kind of scholarship which Graglia brings to it.
"Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
11L. GRAGLIA, Supra note 8, at 279.
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